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Abstract
In this paper we sketch a framework supporting contract 
enactment within the context of virtual organisation units 
that are dynamically created in order to achieve a common 
objective by securely sharing resources, services and 
information. The framework is built on top of a joint 
extension of the policy deployment architecture for peer-
to- peer communities that we proposed in [1] and the 
contract enactment capability described in [6] that enables 
monitoring, mediation, arbitration and enforcement of 
electronic contracts in multiple, simultaneous closed 
collaborations. A longer-term goal is to deliver a scalable 
method of setting up contract enforcement and contract 
performance management infrastructures for inter-
organisational information systems that allow the on-
demand creation and dynamic evolution of secure Virtual 
Organisations based on the ad-hoc integration of systems 
across Enterprise boundaries.
1 Introduction 
The Internet provides a ubiquitous, standards-based 
substrate for global communications of all kinds. Rapid 
advances are now being made in agreeing protocols and 
machine-processible message/document formats that will 
soon enable open application-application communication 
and brings about the prospect of ad hoc integration of 
systems across organisational boundaries to support 
collaborations that may last for a single transaction or 
evolve dynamically over many years. Effectively, we will 
witness on-demand creation of dynamically-evolving, 
scalable Virtual Organisations (VO) spanning national 
and enterprise borders, where the participating entities 
pool resources, capabilities and information to achieve 
common objectives. 
 This paper deals with the problem of supporting 
secure, trusted and predictable interactions between 
parties involved in a VO throughout its life-cycle. By 
Virtual Organisation we mean a dynamically created 
collaborative arrangement between existing organisations 
or their organisational units to achieve a specific 
objective. Typically, the life cycle of a VO is shorter than 
life-cycle of traditional organisations. 
 This paper proposes the use of Closed Collaboration 
Teams (CCT) paradigm that is a generalisation of the 
Closed User Group architecture discussed in [1], to 
support secure and trusted interactions in VOs. CCT 
provides a dynamic and distributed support for P2P 
collaboration, taking into account hierarchical 
administration requirements. It allows a scalable method 
of setting up security infrastructures that has the benefits 
of allowing P2P collaboration, whilst maintaining the 
robustness and re-configurability of systems supplied by 
the central administration of the security policies. 
 Secure and trusted operations of VOs represent one 
prerequisite for their functioning. A further requirement is 
to support the interactions between VO’s constituents in a 
similar way as in traditional organisations to ensure that 
their interactions comply with their business agreements. 
To this end the VOs can make use of services provided by 
the specialised contract management systems. These 
services for example facilitate recording of their newly 
created terms of agreement, monitoring of their 
performance and notifications and enforcement. The 
contract management system used to support the Vos 
requirements is based on the BCA paradigm described in 
[6], [7], [8]. 
 The main novelty of this paper is an integration of 
CCT (as a flexible and trusted distributed collaborative 
architecture) and BCA (as an enterprise wide distributed 
contract management architecture). The primary aim of 
this integration is to support secure, trusted and 
agreement-complaint functioning of VOs but also other 
forms of extended enterprises. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 present key 
ideas behind the Closed Collaboration Teams. Section 3 
outlines main architectural components of Business 
Contract Architecture. In Section 4 we consider 
integration of these two architectures. Conclusions and 
Future Work are outlined in section 5. 
2 Closed Collaboration Teams 
Closed Collaboration Teams (CCT) are inspired by 
variant of the Closed User Group concept (CUG) 
proposed in [3] and brought further in [1] for multi-
domain security management in virtual organisations. 
They provide a new distributed and secure dynamic 
environment for collaborative working without 
topological constraints. 
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 In its simplest form the CCT model distinguishes two 
main classes of roles: team members and team manager.
 Team members are peers who are informed of each 
others identity and location and are interacting with 
each other on a peer-to-peer basis by using of some 
type of group certificates embedded in the messages 
they interchange. Messages with certificate 
information that is not matching the required team 
certificate are blocked by a firewall application 
enforcement component associated with each peer. 
(See also section 2.4.) 
 Team manager is responsible for managing team 
membership and issuing or updating team certificates. 
Team manager of one level in the organizational 
hierarchy may themselves be viewed as members of a 
CCT at a level above the level of the teams they 
manage. 
 In the context of this paper, we assume for simplicity 
that each entity in an organisation is primarily assigned to 
a single manager called its "local" manager. Clearly, 
each manager can have many "local" members. This 
structure resembles line management in structured 
organisations. In the context of this paper, we treat the 
restriction to a unique "local" manager as a convention. 
However, it is worth noting that, certain network 
topologies impose such locals as their primary topological 
structure (e.g. users of a LAN and LAN administrator). 
All existing CCT members are informed of the 
arrival or departure of a client member and the CCT exists 
until the last member leaves, be it the creator or any of the 
members. Interactions between CCT peers are assumed to 
be based on exchange of certified messages. For the 
purpose of this paper, we distinguish two types of 
certificate information: 
 me2me: member-to-member certificate information is 
unique to each team, and is used to enable direct peer-
to-peer communication between the members of CCT, 
such as file transfers, process invocation (via Remote 
Procedure Calls), etc. 
 me2ma: member-to-management certificate 
information is unique to each team manager and 
enable interaction relating to CCT management. (It is 
assumed that a single manager is responsible for each 
specific CCT). 
2.1 Virtual Closed Collaboration Teams 
Members of CCT teams can initiate or join "virtual" CCTs 
which span across organisational units. A virtual CCT can 
be initiated by any member of an existing CCT and any 
member of an existing CCT can request to join a virtual 
CCT1. Virtual CCTs are assigned a "remote" manager 
                                                          
1
 We assume that CCT managers may publish information about existing 
CCTs and any CCT members can discover and inspect information about 
existing CCTs, using for example similar mechanisms to the Web Service 
publication, inspection and discovery. 
chosen (e.g. via self-initiative or voting) among the pre-
existing CCT managers which are contributing members 
to the virtual CCTs. For any member of an existing CCT, 
say X, to be able to initiate the creation of, or joining to, a 
"virtual" CCT, the prior endorsement of its "local" 
manager is required. Depending on the virtual CCT 
policy, joining a CCT may also require endorsement of 
the "remote" manager and/or the management of each 
local that is contributing member to the virtual CCT. 
 Based on its objective, clients may be free to decide to 
participate in a CCT of their interest. Also, participation 
of a client could be compulsory, based on a focus of the 
CCT and purpose of CCT creation (e.g., within a 
company/organisation, different resources and/or 
employees could be allocated for a specific project/work 
task that forms a basis for CCT creation). Once allocated, 
the responsibility of CCT management and maintenance 
remains with the "virtual" manager until CCT termination. 
Managers are responsible for managing and maintaining 
the CCT policy. As we explain in subsection 2.3, CCT 
may rely on external certificate authorities (CA) in order 
to provide the initial identities. 
Figure 1: Basic CCT Structure 
2.2 Basic Interactions in Virtual CCTs 
Figure 2Figure 2 provides an overview of the dynamic 
introduction of a new member X in a virtual CCT named 
V, that is managed by R who is primarily responsible for 
CCT local B. X originates from an organisationally 
distinct CCT local A, managed by L.  
 Member X is prevented from contacting directly R 
whose virtual team V it wishes to join. Instead X sends 
messages to R routed via its local manager L, who has 
also to endorse X's intention to join the virtual team V. If 
L approves, then L effectively acts as a "proxy" member 
and attempts to "join" the team V on X’s behalf. If R 
accepts this, then L will receive a certificate for me2me
communication within the scope of team V, which L will 
forward to X. By possessing this certificate, X is able to 
participate in direct me2me interaction within the scope of 
team V. Notably, L retains a degree of control over its 
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client: First, from X's perspective all me2ma
communication is routed via L, who is able to endorse and 
has to countersign the messages. Second, from R's 
perspective L is the first recipient of all communication 
intended to X. Notably, L would be the intermediary for 
any number of members of team A participating in the 
virtual team V, maintaining the interactions between R 
and each A team member distinct.
Local Manager
(proxy)
Virtual Manager
member X
remote
me2malocal
me2ma
remote
me2me
R’s view of CCT V
local
me2me
- virtual CCT V
- CCT A
- CCT B
Figure 2: Local Manager / Proxy Member Behaviour
2.3 Digital Identity Management Considerations  
The previous sections have described CCTs with the 
assumption that pre-existing member identities are readily 
available. A fundamental question for dynamic virtual 
collaboration is whether an identity can be trusted. More 
specifically this means that an entity’s online identity 
should be fixed and that it can be mapped to the entity’s 
real world presence. One of the main lessons learned from 
previous attempts to create a unique namespace and global 
public key infrastructure (PKI) is that it is very difficult to 
achieve on a global scale, but that it is quite feasible 
within closed or local user groups.  This section describes 
principles for establishing reliable identities within our 
framework.  
 Web-PKI consists of many isolated hierarchic PKIs 
where the root public key of each isolated PKI is hard-
coded in the distribution software of all the major Web 
browsers. Each isolated PKI thus represents a closed 
group with a unique name space. Uniqueness of member 
names is not necessarily guaranteed across different PKIs 
unless the name is an Internet Domain Name, which per 
definition is unique. Despite this potential problem, Web 
servers and clients can have their certificates from 
different PKIs, and still be able to authenticate and 
communicate securely with each other. 
 We propose to base CCT members identities on 
public-key certificates issued by CAs outside the CCT. 
Members can choose any commercial CA belonging to 
any PKI as long as the PKI is recognised by the CCT 
Managers. This requires the CCT managers to obtain 
multiple PKI root public keys in order to recognise 
certificates issued by CAs belonging to different PKIs. 
This is similar to the way Web-browsers are able to 
recognise server certificates issued by different CAs 
because the root public key of each isolated PKIs is hard-
coded in the browser software. 
 External CAs provide the required physical 
infrastructure that is required. By relying in external 
commercial CAs, CCTs will be able to issue certificates 
without the need for any additional physical infrastructure 
to their standard Information and Communication 
Technology. This is consistent with the intention to the 
have CCTs operate online as far as possible. 
 In a typical scenario party X and party Y contact 
manager M, or are invited by manager M to join a 
particular virtual CCT. Party X presents a public-key 
identity certificate issued by a CA in PKI1 and party Y 
presents an identity certificate issued by another CA in 
PKI2. Manager M recognises both PKIs and is able to 
validate both certificates because M has already obtained 
the root public keys of PKI1 and PKI2. Party A and B will 
then be issued with me2me and me2ma certificates to be 
used within the virtual CCT.  This is illustrated in Figure 
3Figure 3
PK I1 PK I2
X Y
YX
M
R oo t P K1
R oo t P K2
Figure 3: External PKIs and CCT-PKI 
 The certificate structure of each CCT can be seen as a 
single-level autonomous PKI that has been established for 
the purpose of the CCT only and where the CCT manager 
represents the CA. If anonymity is required by a member, 
the manager can issue CCT certificates with fictive 
member identities. Accountability can still be assured by 
the manager being able to translate the anonymous 
identity to the real identity if required e.g. in case of 
dispute resolution. 
2.4 CCTs seen as flexible virtual firewalls 
The CCT interaction model allows for hierarchies of 
communities of peers, where peers at the same level of an 
organisational structure may interact with each other on a 
P2P basis and with their local manager within closed VO 
teams. Local managers intercept communication between 
peers across different levels of the organisational structure 
within the same or different enterprises.  This is combined 
with a security enforcement mechanism that provides the 
basic functionality of a distributed firewall application. 
For the purposes of the architecture described in this 
paper, we can assume a simple Software Firewall 
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Application (SFA) residing2 with each of the entities in a 
CCT local (including the local manager). SFA can be 
understood as an enforcement agent enacting in-bound / 
out-bound communication policy controls in a preventive 
way. That is, each CCT member’s SFA executes a set of 
rules, defined and owned by the local CCT manager and 
relating to the role of each CCT member. These rules 
regulate in-bound and out-bound communication. For 
example, the SFA of a peer M blocks all messages 
addressed to M that do not have a me2ma certificate or a 
me2ma certificate relating to some CCT that M is a 
member of. To do this SFA may compare against a local 
list of certificates accepted by M. Blocking out-bound 
communication is potentially more demanding (although 
often less critical). In the case of me2me communication, 
for example, in addition to the me2me certificate, SFA has 
also to verify that the intended recipient is a member of 
the CCT that the me2me certificate relates to. As we 
explain in [1], preventive enforcement of more refined 
rules relating to permission and prohibition policies can 
also be supported by enabling SFA to interpret and 
execute enforcement rules interpreting such policies and 
incorporating essential information about the privileges of 
a peer in m2m certificates. 
 The CCT model described above addresses one aspect 
of collaborative interactions in VOs – dealing mostly with 
permission and prohibition policies. However, rules of 
engagement in VOs also include the expression of 
obligation policies and require an additional framework 
for checking fulfilment of obligations. To this end the 
CCT model can be augmented with the capabilities of a 
contract management system such as previously described 
in [6].  Although more dynamic than conventional 
distributed firewalls, the CCT enforcement model has to 
become more flexible in order to secure the dynamic VO 
configurations facilitated by the CCT management model. 
For example, members of a virtual CCT A can indirectly 
compromise the operation of other competing virtual 
CCTs by causing damage to their shared resources 
through apparently legitimate interactions in the context 
of A. One way to alleviate such interference is by 
introducing CCT contracts that: 
- necessitate partitioning resources dedicated to different 
CCTs;
- require that, for a member to join a new virtual CCT, 
its local manager has to inform all of its existing 
remote managers about the member’s intentions, and 
seek their prior agreement; 
- take advantage of a capability enabling collaborative 
contract performance monitoring and notification 
among CCTs; 
- take advantage of collaborative contract enforcement 
mechanisms across CCTs. 
                                                          
2
 SFA may physically reside with the CCT member or act as a proxy 
associated with it. In the context of this paper we do not distinguish 
between these two options. 
The above provide additional motivation for enhancing 
the CCT concept through the introduction of an effective 
trust and contract management capability, which is main 
focus of the rest of the paper. 
3  Contract Establishment and Execution 
 This section describes the basic components of 
architecture for contract establishment and execution 
based on [6], which can be seen as an extension of the 
Business Contract Architecture (BCA) described in [7]. 
3.1 Roles Supporting Contract Establishment 
The following roles support the process of establishing a 
contract: 
- Negotiator mediates the negotiation process. During 
the negotiation phase parties can exchange offers and 
counter-offers containing one or more of the 
following: contract templates, individual contract 
clauses and finally contract variables that are 
negotiable items. During contract negotiations it may 
be possible to do certain aspects contract validity 
checking as mentioned below. 
- Validator ensures the creation of legally valid contract 
instances, assessing proposed contracts against 
various aspects of contract validity such as 
competence, clarity, legal purpose and consideration 
elements. See [8] for further details on contract 
validation. 
- Notary is a trusted party that stores contract instances 
after the contract has been agreed upon, checked for 
validity and signed by both parties. Such contract 
instances can be later used as evidence of agreement 
in the contract monitoring and enforcement activities. 
Notary component can be also hosted by one or both 
parties involved in contract. 
- Contract Forms Repository provides storage and 
access to standard contract forms or contract clauses, 
depending on contractual scenario. It can be used by 
parties to the contract who use pre-defined contract 
forms to produce individual contract instances or by 
contract drafters who are defining building blocks for 
contracts. There may be also a need for a specialised 
contract templates editor that can provide 
functionality of both text editing but also type 
definitions for the fields that represent negotiable 
items within the contract. 
3.2 Roles Supporting Contract Execution 
The following roles support contract enforcement and 
performance monitoring during the contract execution. 
 Monitor enables monitoring of the activities of 
parties, measuring their performance if needed and 
recording the relevant events. It can also signal a contract 
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non-performance to the Discretionary Enforcement 
Moderator (DEM, see below) if it detects such an event.  
 Notifier implements various notifications mechanisms 
needed to send warning messages to indicate a pending 
contract-significant event, including possible non-
compliance event that may be detected. To simplify 
presentation, Notifier is not shown in the figure. 
 Enforcer applies enforcing actions directly to the 
parties to ensure that some specific behaviour conforms to 
the contract. From a control theory point of view, this role 
is analogous to an actuator. 
 Discretionary Enforcement Moderator (DEM) 
forms an opinion about the extent of deviation by the non-
performing parties. Once the arbitrator forms such an 
opinion, it chooses a route of action which may invoke 
settlement leading to the success of a suitably amended 
transaction. Alternatively, it may endorse the enforcement 
of corrective measures to be executed by a preventive 
security mechanism realised by the Contract Enforcer 
role. (An overview of the DEM’s decision making 
procedure is modelled as a finite state machine in [6].) 
The DEM forms its opinions on the basis of evidence 
about deviation of the non-performing parties, that is 
provided by the Contract Monitor, external advisors and 
possibly additional recommendations from agents 
representing the parties, in a spirit similar to a (human) 
judge’s process for arriving at his ruling. During this 
process the DEM component may take the following 
specific roles. 
- Mediator - who initiates a settlement leading to the 
success of an amended transaction or decides failure 
of mediation leading to the invocation of arbitration.  
- Arbitrator - takes over when a settlement as per 
above cannot be reached, or when a party’s deviation 
from the expected performance is high enough to 
justify the deployment of corrective measures. An 
arbitrator may initiate the enforcement of corrective 
measures through the Contract Enforcer, leading to 
the recoverable failure of the transaction and, 
potentially to penalising the non-performing party. In 
the absence of any suitable corrective measures, the 
Arbitrator may signal correction failure, in which 
case the Contract Validator is informed so as to 
prevent further access to the system by the non-
performing parties, if necessary, and the case is 
carried on outside the Contract Architecture.
4 Method Integration 
 In this section we discuss an integration of the above 
role-based architectures for CCTs and Contract 
Establishment and Executions. The result of this fusion is 
a novel architecture enabling the different organisational 
units to negotiate their terms of involvement in virtual 
organisations, encode them within electronic contracts and 
use this as a basis for governing their interactions. This 
governance is facilitated by using a distributed inter-
organisational contract management infrastructure 
ensuring predictable, contract-complaint interactions – 
and augmented with the secure and trusted interactions in 
accordance with the policies stated in the CCT.  
 Each virtual organisation unit amounts to a virtual 
CCT which is executing a distinct contract. Each CCT 
member may participate in any number of contracts, 
characterised by the number of the virtual CCTs in which 
they participate. Different CCTs share distributed 
capabilities for contract monitoring and enforcement. 
 A motivation determining the choice of integration is 
on the one hand, to improve the manageability and 
security of CCTs by sharing monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms between them, while on the other hand, to 
secure the execution of each contract by ensuring that 
members who are not engaged in the contract are 
prevented from directly interfering with the contract 
execution.
Local 
Manager
(proxy)
Virtual 
Manager
member X
remote
me2ma
remote
me2me
Validator Negotiator
Contract Forms 
Repository
Notary
Figure 4: Basic contract establishment roles across CCT 
4.1 Contract establishment  
CCT locals can be understood as a common abstraction of 
various different types of moderated closed communities. 
Different types of local policies may be used to govern 
such communities depending on their objective. Often the 
local policies would be an extension of some enterprise-
wide policies that apply to each CCT local, as an 
organisational unit within an enterprise. To realise secure 
collaborations across CCT locals, however, entities will 
need to form virtual CCTs, which are governed by some 
collaboration agreement, encoded by means of an 
electronic contract. The formation of such collaboration 
agreements requires that the prospective virtual CCT 
members negotiate their terms of involvement. 
 The contract governing the operation of a virtual CCT 
may also refer to the policies of the participating CCT 
locals, and the conditions in the contract will effectively 
determine the role of the signatory members in the CCT, 
their privileges and obligations, as well as any sanctions 
that may automatically apply in basic cases of non-
performance.  
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 The process of negotiating a contract with a virtual 
CCT becomes more efficient in the presence of supporting 
services implementing the roles described in section 3.1. 
Once a virtual CCT is initiated the prospective virtual 
CCT manager is responsible for initiating the preparation 
of a contract template. Depending on contractual scenario, 
a Contract Forms Repository is used to store standard 
contract forms or contract clauses, to be used by the CCT 
in order to produce the specific contract instance 
governing its operation. The contract negotiation process 
is moderated by the virtual CCT manager and facilitated 
by the mediation of a contract negotiator. The latter can be 
either a trusted third party or a functionality implemented 
collectively by the CCT community – in which case the 
CCT manager is directly responsible for orchestrating the 
contract negotiation process.  
 Typically, contract negotiation is an iterative process 
where contract drafts are periodically checked by the 
contract Validator who ensures the creation of a legally 
valid contract. In most cases the Validator will be a 
trusted third party outside of a CCT local. Once the 
contract instance governing a CCT local is agreed, the 
Notary stores it. The Notary is a trusted third party outside 
of a CCT local. Since CCT contract instances may refer to 
agreements that include references to Industry-wide 
regulations, one can expect both Industry-wide and 
enterprise-wide Notaries. The latter maintain validated 
contract instances about the CCTs locals within an 
enterprise, which include references to more basic 
Industry-wide contract instances maintained by the 
former.  
MonitorEnforcer
Notary
Mediator
Arbitrator
DEM
Figure 5: Basic contract execution roles within a CCT local 
4.2 Contract enactment within a CCT local 
Contract enactment within a CCT local is supported by a 
Moderator (DEM) who is capable of arbitrating about the 
performance of a CCT on the basis of evidence provided 
by a CCT Monitor. In the case of non-compliance by a 
CCT member, the Moderator will initiate either a 
mediation process, managed by a Mediator, or the 
enforcement of any sanctions applicable, which will be 
carried out by the Enforcer. 
 In this subsection we place particular emphasis on 
performance assessment and enforcement during the 
enactment of a contract within a CCT local, as the 
contract monitoring and enforcement management 
mechanisms of CCT locals also underpin contract 
enactment in virtual CCTs that span across several CCT 
locals. We also explain how subjective logic [4] can 
provide a formal foundation for encoding, communicating 
and collating evidence and support arbitration. 
4.2.1 Performance monitoring 
We assume a Monitor capability associated within each 
CCT local that enables monitoring of the activities of 
parties, measuring their performance and recording the 
relevant events. It is subscribed to contract significant 
events and when these occur, it evaluates the policies for 
these events, against the agreements that are stored in 
Notary.  
 We propose that evidence can be associated to the 
monitoring of events. Associating confidence to events is 
reasonable for virtual organisations built on top of 
dynamic service environments. Such environments, 
distributed over WAN, typically use asynchronous 
communication of events that often takes place on a 
"push" basis: "consumers" subscribe to events and 
"producers" are obliged to notify them when they produce 
an event by sending a message of a specific type. In such 
situations, the occurrence of an event may be uncertain for 
a variety of reasons including: failure of the “producer” to 
produce a notification about an event that occurred, delays 
with the notification, malicious notification about an event 
(e.g. a failure) that did not occur, etc. In such 
environments, a CCT Monitor act a as an intermediary 
facilitating event collection: it collects events generated as 
a result of CCT interactions and either they forward them 
to a CCT management capability (e.g. the Moderator) or 
they analyse them and generate a derived for the CCT 
management. The derived event may depend on the 
occurrence of a number of potentially interdependent 
events within the CCT. 
 Although we may associate confidence parameters 
with an event, we do not assume any non-trivial reasoning 
on decision making to be undertaken by a Monitor. 
Effectively, monitors report the events they monitor, even 
when they themselves can only get second hand evidence. 
The CCT Moderator does the reasoning and makes the 
decisions. The monitors can supply degrees of confidence 
with each reported event, so that the CCT Moderator has a 
basis for reasoning and making decisions. If monitors 
need to do some complex analysis in order to determine if 
an event has occurred, e.g. indirectly via related events, 
then performing that analysis is a separate function which 
might rely on Subjective Logic or other techniques. 
(Neural networks could for example be used to detect 
deviation from typical behaviour, in order to report that an 
event is suspect.) 
 Depending on the configuration of the CCT local we 
distinguish three different kinds of monitoring: 
centralised, devolved, and locally coordinated. Each kind 
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of monitoring necessitates Monitor behaviours that are 
operationally different (when viewed from within a CCT 
local) but observationally similar (when viewed from the 
outside of a CCT local). We examine each of kind in turn: 
 Centralised. A centralised monitor is subscribed to 
contract significant events and when these occur, it 
evaluates the policies for these events, against the 
agreements that are stored in Notary. It also passes the 
results of the evaluation to other components as 
needed. In relation to the local me2me 
communication, the functionality of the monitor is 
restricted to observing local events, monitoring 
network traffic and occasionally intercepting messages 
sent or received by CCT members. Should events 
created within a CCT local need to be communicated 
outside the local, Monitor takes the role of the 
intermediary in such communication. 
 Devolved. A devolved monitor can be effectively 
understood as an abstraction representing a collective 
realisation of a monitoring capability. That is, each 
CCT member comes with its own “atomic” (in relative 
terms) monitoring capability, which contributes to the 
formation of a collective opinion regarding a potential 
deviation from the agreed level of quality. Devolved 
monitoring appears to be a natural choice of 
monitoring scheme for CCTs that are formed in the 
absence of uniform and sophisticated underlying 
infrastructure management services. For example, 
groups of handheld devices forming ad-hoc networks 
via point-to-point infrared, satellite or wireless links. 
 Locally Coordinated. A locally coordinated Monitor 
combines the behaviour of devolved monitoring with a 
centralised coordinator who uses a trust metric 
referring to the competence of each CCT local 
member for the monitoring task and weights the 
evidence provided by each local member against trust 
in its monitoring capability. Each member is 
contributing evidence encoded in a message, which is 
a (potentially distinguished) part of its me2ma 
communication and can be encoded in a special 
me2ma certificate. 
4.2.2 Contract Enforcement 
We assume a Moderator and an Enforcer capabilities 
associated with each CCT local that collectively enable 
imperative or discretionary enforcement during contract 
enactment. By “discretionary enforcement” we refer to 
contract enforcement actions aiming at alleviating or 
correcting performance deviations through mediation (in 
order to reconcile non-performing CCT members and 
initiate a settlement leading the success of an amended 
transaction) or through arbitration by either deploying 
corrective measures or by referring settlement to an 
authority outside the CCT structure while “freezing” or 
“revoking” CCT membership of non-performers. By 
“imperative enforcement” we refer to contract 
enforcement actions that are performed in a non-
discretionary way and directly to the parties in order to 
ensure that some specific behaviour conforms to the 
contract. For example, to invoke some access control 
enforcement mechanism in order to prevent access to a 
CCT resource, responding to a potential intruder, or 
revoking the membership of a misbehaving party. 
 In general, the Moderator orchestrates enforcement by 
delegating proactive enforcement actions to Enforcer, and 
discretionary enforcement actions to Mediator or to 
Arbitrator (if mediation fails or the deviation is too 
serious)3. The choice of enforcement route is determined 
by the Moderator’s opinion about the extent of deviation 
and risk it entails.  
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Figure 6: Basic contract execution roles for virtual CCTs 
Imperative enforcement can be further distinguished in 
proactive and reactive and this entails a further dichotomy 
to the functionality captured by the Enforcer. Proactive 
enforcement actions are either dictated by the contract (or 
a CCT local policy) in order to prevent a foreseen threat, 
or the Moderator initiates them in order to avoid critical 
deviation or costly contract violations. Reactive 
enforcement actions are either dictated by the contract as 
sanctions for non-compliance or the Moderator initiates 
them as a result of arbitration following a failure to settle 
non-performance through mediation. As indicated in [1], 
the mechanisms required for performing proactive and 
reactive enforcement actions are behaviourally different. 
4.3 Contract enactment across CCT locals 
Contract enactment across CCT locals may require 
collaboration between their corresponding Moderators, 
Monitors and Enforcer components. The effectiveness of 
                                                          
3
 See section 3.2 for a summary of the Moderator role. See also [6] for a 
more elaborate presentation of this part of the contract enforcement 
model emphasising on discretionary enforcement options. 
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collaborative contract enactment depends on the right 
distribution of control, liability, and privileges between 
the main roles participating in the enactment. In particular, 
the distribution of control strengthens the dependency of 
collaborative contract enactment on trust relationships 
between these roles. As in the case of analysing contract 
enactment within a CCT local, and in order to ease 
readability, we distinguish performance monitoring from 
contract enforcement. We also explain how the main 
operators of Subjective Logic [4] provide a formal 
foundation for encoding, communicating and collating 
evidence and support arbitration. 
4.3.1 Performance monitoring 
The Monitor capability of a virtual CCT effectively 
amounts to a conceptualisation of a network of CCT local 
Monitors, each of which are responsible for monitoring of 
the activities of parties, measuring their performance, 
recording and reporting the relevant events within their 
CCT local. Each CCT local monitor participating in a 
virtual CCT monitor is subscribed to contract significant 
events (within its own locality) and when these occur, it 
evaluates the policies for these events, against the 
agreements that are stored in Notary.  
 The virtual CCT monitor also needs to have the ability 
to pass the result of evaluation to other components, as 
needed. These other components can be a Notifier, which 
simply send notifications formatted in appropriate way to 
the parties involved or to a Moderator who is capable of 
further more sophisticated processing such as mediation 
and arbitration, potentially leading to subsequent 
mediation or enforcement actions. 
 Recall that evidence may be associated to events. The 
virtual CCT will combine the evidence contributed by 
each local monitor with a trust metric, which refers to 
confidence in the competence of each CCT local for the 
monitoring task. In case of performance assessment, 
dispute, or potential non-compliance, where decision 
making may be required, this trust metric will be used in 
order to discount the evidence provided by each CCT 
local (and communicated via its local Manager) against 
trust in its monitoring capability. 
 A Monitor for a virtual CCT can be understood as a 
network of CCT local Monitors. Each local Monitor is 
subscribed to contract significant events and when these 
occur, it evaluates the policies for these events, against the 
agreements that are stored in Notary. Evidence is then 
communicated to the virtual CCT via the local 
management. (Recall that the local Manager manages all 
administrative communication to and from the outside of 
the CCT local.) The virtual CCT incorporates the 
evidence contributed by each local monitor using a trust 
metric, which refers to the competence of each CCT local 
for the monitoring task, in order to discount the evidence 
provided by each CCT local (and communicated via its 
local Manager) against trust in its monitoring capability. 
 In subsection 4.3.4, we provide a scheme for 
incorporating evidence provided from the participating 
CCT local monitors. Depending on the configuration of 
the participating locals (i.e. centralised, devolved, and 
locally coordinated examined in subsection 4.2.1), 
different kinds of monitoring schemes instances may be 
produced. The scheme is intended for use by the 
Moderator of the virtual CCT, or any other role who is 
responsible for decision making. Being analogous to a 
“network of sensors”, the Monitor of a virtual CCT does 
not perform decision making itself. However, to correctly 
incorporate the reported evidence into a decision making 
mechanism requires a scheme that reflects the 
configuration of such a “network of sensors”. 
4.3.2 Contract Enforcement 
Enforcement in a virtual CCT is orchestrated by a 
Moderator. This can be either a Trusted Third Party or the 
entity undertaking Moderator’s role in the virtual CCT 
manager’s own locality. In any case the authority of the 
Moderator has to be accepted by every member of the 
virtual CCT and their corresponding local managers.  
 In analogy to the case of a CCT local, the Moderator 
associated with a virtual CCT provides a Mediation and 
an Arbitration capability, and pending on the opinion it 
has formed about the extent of deviation by the non-
performing parties. In addition to considering evidence 
from the Monitor and the parties themselves, the 
Moderator may seek recommendations from some or all 
the rest of the CCT membership and from external 
Advisors in order to reduce its own uncertainty or reassess 
its trust to the parties providing partial evidence. 
Subsection 4.3.4 elaborates on the use of Subjective Logic 
for this purpose and subsection 4.4 illustrates our 
approach by means of an example. Once the Mediator 
forms such an opinion, it chooses a route of action. 
Depending on the extent of non-performance, action may 
invoke settlement leading to the success of a suitably 
amended transaction, deployment of corrective measures 
or contract failure,  
  In [6] we provided an abstract interpretation of 
the contract enforcement processes as a finite state 
machine (
Figure 7Figure 7). We used five different levels as a 
means of classifying the states and transactions between 
the sates of the enforcement process according to the 
degree with which the transaction execution is on 
compliance with the prescribed agreement. Level 1 means 
that the transaction is executed according to the prescribed 
contract. Deviations can occur as long as notifications to 
the contractual parties result in the execution getting back 
on track. Level 2 means that the transaction has deviated 
from the prescribed contract, and warnings to non-
compliant parties have been ignored. The Monitor informs 
the DEM which in turn invokes the Mediator, and an 
attempt to establish an amended contract between the two 
parties is initiated. In case of settlement the contract 
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execution returns to Level 1 and resumes with the 
amended contract as a basis.  Level 3 reflects that the 
Mediator was not able to make the contractual parties 
agree on an amended contract. The Arbitrator collects all 
available evidence in order to reach the fairest decision 
possible. In case the Arbitrator’s decision is accepted by 
all parties, the contract execution returns to Level 1 and 
resumes with the arbitrated contract as basis. Level 4
reflects the fact that the arbitration decision is not 
accepted by some of the contractual parties. The Mediator 
attempts to sanction the parties it sees as non-compliant, 
by invoking the corresponding Enforcer. Level 5 reflects
the fact that the DEM was not able to sanction the non-
compliant parties. Legal procedures, outside of the realm 
of the e-contract management system, may be initiated. 
Level 1
Level 2
Level 3
Level 4
Level 5
Contract
Execution
Transaction
Success
Corrected
Arbitration
Failure
Uncorrected
Arbitration
Failure
Mediation
Arbitration
Correction
Compliance
Breach
Failure
Failure
Success
Failure
Settlement
Settlement
Figure 7: Contract enforcement process seen as a state 
diagram organised in layers of criticality 
 After transaction completion, at the first three levels, 
the contractual parties are invited to provide feedback 
about each others performance. The feedback is collected 
by the Feedback Collection Centre (FCC) and is used to 
derive a reputation rating about each party in the system. 
Once the fourth level is reached, feedback is not collected 
from the contractual parties because it is assumed that the
hostility between them will make the feedback highly
biased and unreliable. 
4.3.3 Enforcer in virtual CCTs 
The functionality of the Enforcer for a virtual CCT is 
collectively realised by the enforcement capabilities of the 
participating CCT locals, coordinated by the Moderator of 
the virtual CCT. Since virtual CCTs span across 
organisational units and local managers act as 
intermediaries in any me2ma communication between 
local members and remote manager, any enforcement 
action takes place at a local level, although it may be 
initiated upon request of the remote Manager. In effect, 
this distribution of responsibility across CCT locals, 
reflects the fact that although contract enforcement in a 
virtual CCT is managed by its Moderator (which may be a 
TTP outside the virtual CCT or a functionality provided 
by entity undertaking the management of the virtual 
CCT), who is also initiating enforcement actions, the 
actual enactment is performed by the enforcer of each 
CCT local. That is, any enforcement options decided by 
the remote management need to be endorsed by the local 
management before they are performed on a member. 
This arrangement reflects the fact that it is the physical 
organisational units (i.e. CCT locals) who are contributing 
resources to a virtual CCT that effectively maintain high-
level control of the contributed resources, even if they 
offer their management to their virtual CCT.  
 Although we do not mandate any particular solution to 
describe how an arbitrator arrives at this opinion, we 
believe that often this may well be based on second-hand 
evidence, and if some quantitative method can be used to 
guide this process, we propose the use of Subjective Logic 
[4]. The latter allows a peer to be able to encode and 
communicate its confidence in the validity of a non-
performance statement or in the dependability of another 
peer’s recommendation. This can be expressed in 
Subjective Logic notation, by means of an opinion 
 udbLMonitore ,, Z  encoding the peer’s belief, disbelief 
and uncertainty. (See [6] for more on the use of Subjective 
Logic for the evidence-based decision making 
underpinning discretionary contract enforcement.) 
 As explained in section 2.2, local managers act as 
intermediaries between local members and remote 
manager in me2ma communication within a virtual CCT. 
Hence, the opinion of the local members is passed to the 
remote manager as a recommendation via the local 
manager. 
4.3.4  Evidence based reasoning for Mediation and 
Arbitration within virtual CCTs 
Subjective Logic [4] provides a suitable mathematical 
foundation for trust-based decision making and combining 
first- and second-hand evidence in the presence of 
uncertainty. Confidence and trust modelling with 
subjective logic is useful when decision making is 
required. During monitoring no decision really has to be 
made, so using subjective logic does not help. It is during 
performance assessment, mediation and enforcement that 
when decisions have to be made, and that's when 
subjective logic can be useful. However, to correctly 
incorporate the reported evidence into a decision making 
mechanism, Moderator needs a scheme that reflects the 
monitoring configurations of the participating CCT locals.
 In the following subsections we will explain how 
evidence provided from virtual CCT members or Monitor 
contributes to the decision making of the Moderator. We 
will use the concepts of an opinion and mainly two 
operators: consensus and discounting .
 In Subjective Logic notation we express the 
association of evidence to events by means of an opinion 
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),,( udbBe  Z  encoding the belief, disbelief and 
uncertainty of a peer B in the actual occurrence of some 
event e. The application of the consensus operator 
C
e
B
e ZZ   effectively reduces uncertainty by collating 
evidence. This is particularly useful for amalgamating 
opinions based on partial evidence independently derived 
from data collected from different sensors. While 
B
e
A
B ZZ   weights the evidence about an event e
provided by an entity B against the belief element of ABZ
representing belief in the competence of B to provide 
strong evidence about e. Disbelief and uncertainty in ABZ
contribute to increasing the uncertainty of Be
A
B ZZ  .
See also [4] and [5] for more on Subjective Logic and [6] 
for more on its application in the mediation and arbitration 
phases of our contract enforcement process. 
Incorporating evidence from Monitor
When applying subjective logic it is normally required to 
provide first hand evidence as input, or else there might be 
hidden dependencies between the input parameters that 
could affect the correctness of the result. The Moderator 
should therefore receive the events and their confidence 
parameters as reported by first hand observers as far as 
possible. For this purpose we propose the following 
scheme for incorporating evidence provided by the 
different monitor configurations presented in subsection 
4.2.1:
)()()( ....1 N
LMonitorDEM
e
LMonitorDEM
e
VMonitorDEM
e ZZZ  
Where:
 1,…, N is an enumeration of the CCT locals which are 
contributing members to a virtual CCT; 
 )()( ,....,1 NLMonitorDEMe
LMonitorDEM
e ZZ  respectively 
denote the Moderator’s opinion derived on the basis of 
the (partial) evidence that has been provided by the 
monitoring capability of each CCT local 1,…, N.
In the following paragraphs we examine how the above 
scheme is instantiated by different monitoring 
configurations of CCT locals. We will write 
DEM
LMonitor
DEM
LMonitor N
ZZ ,...,
1
to denote the opinions 
respectively encoding the virtual CCT’s Moderator 
confidence in the competence of monitoring in each CCT 
local4.
                                                          
4
 As explained in [2], an agent is aware of its degree of trust in itself. Self-
assessment underlies an agent’s ability to seek external advice and to 
decide to delegate a task to another agent. In our case, although the 
Moderator may originate from one of the CCT locals which are 
contributing evidence, it may nevertheless maintain an opinion measuring 
the competence of its own local for Monitoring in a virtual CCT context.
 Instantiation by a centralised monitor configuration is 
straightforward: if iLMonitoreZ denotes the opinion of the 
centralised monitor of ith CCT local, then 
> @ i
i
i
i
i LMonitor
e
DEM
LMonitor
LMonitor
e
DEM
LMonitor
LMonitorDEM
e ZZZZZ   
)(
Note that iLMonitoreZ  is atomic and based on first-hand 
evidence. 
 Instantiation by a locally coordinated monitor is a little 
bit more complicated: if 
k
ii LMonitor
e
LMonitor
e ZZ ,...,
1
respectively denote the opinions of the contributing 
coordinated monitor components (each of which is based 
directly on first-hand evidence), 
i
k
i
i
i
LMC
LMonitor
LMC
LMonitor
ZZ ,...,1 respectively denote the 
opinions encoding the confidence of the local monitor 
coordinator in the competence of each monitor 
component, and DEMLMCiZ  denotes the confidence of the 
Moderator of the virtual CCT to the local monitor 
reporting consistently all evidence provided by the 
relevant sensors it orchestrates in the CCT local and its 
own trust metric for discounting the evidence collected by 
each sensor, then: 
> @
    kii k
i
ii
ii
k
ii
i
i
LMonitor
e
LMC
LMonitor
LMonitor
e
LMC
LMonitor
DEM
LMC
LMonitor
e
LMonitor
e
DEM
LMonitor
LMonitorDEM
e
ZZZZZ
ZZZZ

  
...
,...,
1
1
1)(
The above formula encodes the following process of 
incorporating evidence: 
1. for each local sensor, the trust metric provided by the 
local monitor coordinator is used to discount the 
evidence provided by that sensor; 
2. the results of the above step 1, recording a weighted 
collection of independently generated evidence, are 
amalgamated into an overall opinion using the 
consensus operator;
3. the opinion encoding the confidence of the Moderator 
in the competence of the local monitor coordinator is 
used to discount the overall opinion derived in the 
above step 2. 
Instantiation by a devolved monitor reduces to the 
previous case by making convention that, in the absence 
of any discounting to the opinion of a local sensor, 
forwarding the evidence collected by that sensor to the 
Moderator equals to showing absolute trust to that sensor. 
That is, absence of a local coordinator is the same as 
assuming a trivial imaginary local coordinator that shows 
absolute trust in the monitoring capability of each local 
member. Thus: 
> @
 kii
i
k
ii
i
i
LMonitor
e
LMonitor
e
DEM
LMC
LMonitor
e
LMonitor
e
DEM
LMonitor
LMonitorDEM
e
ZZZ
ZZZZ

  
...
,...,
1
1)(
 Where DEM
LMCi
Z is the opinion presenting the confidence 
of the Moderator in the competence of the ith CCT local 
performing devolved monitoring. 
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Incorporating opinions from CCT members
If dispute arises or, during normal operation, for the 
purpose of assessing the performance of the CCT, the 
CCT moderator may seek the opinion of one or more CCT 
members about the completion of a task or any other 
statement related to the contract compliance. 
 Each CCT member may contribute its opinion encoded 
in a message, which is a (potentially distinguished) part of 
its me2ma communication and can be encoded in a 
special me2ma certificate. The relationship between the 
opinion contributed by each local member and the opinion 
of the Moderator associated with the remote management 
can be expressed in Subjective Logic notation by using a 
combination of the consensus and the discounting 
operators. (We assume CCT members to be able to 
form independent opinions based on first-hand evidence). 
 Since the corresponding CCT local manager acts as an 
intermediary between the local member and the remote 
manager in all me2ma communication, the opinion 
contributed to the CCT Moderator from a CCT member 
via its local manager is discounted by the CCT Moderator 
with its own opinion about the trustworthiness of the local 
manager. In addition, the local manager may choose to 
incorporate its own trust metric referring to its opinion 
about the competence of its local member. This ability of 
the local manager is particularly helpful since the local 
manager has a better overview of its local member’s 
interactions in a variety of context than any of their 
remote managers. The local manager’s opinion can be 
added to the me2ma message sent from the local member 
to the remote manager via the local manager. If the local 
manager does not provide an opinion, then absolute 
confidence of the local manger in the member is assumed. 
The CCT Moderator takes into account these opinions 
using the following scheme. 
 Assume that 1,…,N is an enumeration of the CCT 
locals which are contributing members to a virtual CCT 
and the Moderator solicits opinions from members 
k
ii meme ,....,
1
 CCT local. The Moderator’s opinion based 
on the recommendation of kii meme ,....,
1
 about a 
proposition Dis expressed in Subjective Logic notation by 
the following formula: 
    kiik
i
ii
ii
meLM
me
meLM
me
DEM
LM HD ZZZZZ  ......
1
1
 Note that the operator does not distribute over .
Consequently, the above formula is semantically and 
numerically different than:
   kiik
ii
ii
ii
meLM
me
DEM
LM
meLM
me
DEM
LM HD ZZZZZZ  ...
1
1
 In fact, the latter is wrong because it counts the same 
opinion DEM
LMi
Z  many times in a consensus, therefore 
violating the independence of evidence assumption for .
Intuitively, should the latter formula be allowed the ith
CCT local would be unfairly influencing the opinion of 
the Moderator. Consequently, instead of taking into 
account the opinions as solicited by the CCT members 
(originators), the Mediator needs to group together all 
opinions communicated via the CCT local manager 
(common intermediary). 
4.4 Example  
In the example, we look at the distributed CCT that 
represents a Collaborative Project. Project responsibilities 
are divided between the participant organisations, namely: 
a University, a Research Institute and a Company. Each of 
the institutions has several resources (people and/or 
services) directly participating in the project environment 
that is understood as a virtual CCT. It has been agreed that 
a Company will be in charge of the overall project. 
Therefore, its administration service (Com) acts as a 
remote Manager of the CCT, while the administration 
services of University and Research Institute (Uni and RI,
respectively) act as an “intermediate” service, 
maintaining communication of its local clients with CCT 
manager. However, members are collaborating through 
P2P communication between them, without involvement 
of their local administrators. The following entities are 
directly involved in the project: computational resources 
at the University (uni1), simulation tool (ri1) and a 
researcher (ri2) at the Research Institute, and two 
researchers at the Company (com1 and com2), Figure 
8Figure 8.
Uni
Com
RI
mediator
local
1me2ma
local
2me2ma
remote
me2ma
uni1 ri1 ri2com1
remote me2me
com2
Figure 8: Virtual Group of Collaboration Project 
Opinion:  1.0,2.0,7.01  uni anonZ
Uni1  Justification: Following a recent upgrade, unavailability 
of resources at un1 has been limited. 
Opinion:  2.0,7.0,1.01  com anonZ
Com1 Justification: I have been using uni1 resources directly, 
without major problems 
Opinion:  6.0,2.0,2.02  com anonZ
Com2 Justification: I have not been using the un1 resources 
regularly during this period.   
Ri1 Opinion:  1.0,1.0,8.01  ri anonZ
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Justification: During this period  there was limited 
availability (40%) of the computational 
resources uni1
Opinion:  3.0,1.0,6.02  ri anonZ
Ri2 Justification: Sometimes resources at uni1 were 
unavailable, but ri2 did not use them 
frequently enough to be sure. 
Table 1: Member’s opinions 
                Trustor: 
Trustee:
Company Admin (COM) 
com1  2.0,2.0,6.01  COMcomZ
com2  2.0,2.0,6.02  COMcomZ
University Admin (UNI)
uni1  2.0,2.0,6.01  UNIuniZ
Research Institute Admin (RI)
ri1  2.0,2.0,6.01  RIriZ
ri2  2.0,2.0,6.02  RIriZ
Table 2: Inter-organisational trust values 
              Trustor: 
Trustee:
Company Admin (COM)
UNI  3.0,2.0,5.0 COMUNIZ
RI  3.0,3.0,4.0 COMRIZ
Table 3: Local trust values 
The agreed service level conditions include that: 
1) results from the simulation tools must not be delayed 
more than 2 hours in total during one week, and that 
2) unavailability of the computational resources will not 
be more than 4 hours in any 24h period.
Assume that researcher com2 estimates that results from 
the simulation tool were continuously delayed for over 3 
hours/week over the period of last three week, and 
complains in order to preserve a good progress of the 
project. In response, simulation tool ri1 claims that non-
performance was due to frequent unavailability of the 
computational resources uni1.
 The Moderator associated with the management of the 
Collaborative Project is therefore called upon and initiates 
a mediation process. The moderator asks each member of 
the CCT to provide their opinions about the unavailability 
of resources uni1 (claim: non-a). Their opinions are 
summarised in Table 1Table 1.
 The Moderator takes the opinions of the local 
members com1 and com2 (at the company) directly from 
the members and incorporates its own opinion about their 
competence in providing recommendations for this matter, 
represented respectively as COM
com
COM
com 21 ,ZZ . See also Table 
2Table 2.
 Opinions from the other CCT members are received 
via their local managers, who act as their intermediaries in 
me2ma communication. Each of the local managers is 
thus acting as an advisor, using its own confidence in the 
competence of its local member to provide evidence for 
this matter in order to discount the actual evidence 
provided by each of its local members participating in the 
Collaborative project. Furthermore, the Moderator takes 
into account its trust in the management of the 
corresponding organization when incorporating all 
recommendations. Opinions capturing the above are 
presented in Table 2Table 2 and Table 3Table 3.
 Overall, Mediator’s opinion about resources 
unavailability is given by the following formula presented 
in Subjective Logic notation:  
   ))2,1(:),1(:,2,1(: ririRIuniUNIcomcomCOManonE Z
   RIlocanonCOMRIUNIlocanonCOMUNICOMlocanon   ZZZZZ
Where:  
1.    2211 com anonCOMcomcom anonCOMcomCOMlocanon   ZZZZZ
presents the Moderator’s opinion about resources 
unavailability, based on the opinions of its local 
members; 
2.    2211 ri anonRIriri anonRIriRIlocanon   ZZZZZ ,
presents the evidence about resources unavailability, 
provided by the local members of the research 
institute participating in the Collaborative Project; 
3. 11
uni
anon
UNI
uni
UNIloc
anon   ZZZ  presents the evidence 
about resource provided by the local member of the 
university. 
Note that even if members of a participating local (ie. 
Company, University, Research Institute) each sends 
opinions to the Moderator associated with the remote 
administration, this Moderator is grouping all 
recommendations originating from the same local. As 
explained in section 4.3.4, this is done in order to ensure 
that evidence communicated via the same intermediary is 
grouped together and then discounted with the trust in that 
intermediary before taken into consideration.  
 The overall Moderator’s opinion about non-
availability of the resources during the critical period is: 
)021.0.229.0,748.0( 
COM
anonZ . Probability expectation 
[4]   760.0))2,1(:),1(:,2,1(:   ririRIuniUNIcomcomCOManonE Z  presents 
the result of Moderator’s judgement.  
 Assuming that a minimum value of 0.75 is defined as a 
threshold for the mediator to pronounce a decision, the 
conclusion is that a contract breach occurred due to 
computational resources non-availability, and not due to 
delayed delivery of simulation tool results. 
 Unfortunately the Collaborative Project contract does 
not provide a specific sanctioning and recovery 
mechanism for this case. Consequently, the Mediator and 
Negotiator capabilities of the Company’s management are 
called in and an recovery (together with a contract 
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amendment are negotiated.) The University agrees to pay 
a fine of £1,000 and initiate a further update in order to 
improve availability of its resources. The Moderator of 
company’s management delegates to the enforcer of the 
University to bring about the software update.  
5  Conclusion & Further Work 
Security, trust and compliance to the collaborative 
business agreements are the main prerequisites for 
successful functioning and operation of Virtual 
Organizations (VO). 
 In this paper we explored the problem of supporting 
secure and dynamically evolving collaborations between 
parties involved in a VO throughout its life-cycle. We 
proposed a new paradigm based on the integration of the 
Closed Collaboration Teams (CCT) paradigm and 
Business Contract Architecture (BCA), which we expect 
to provide the basis for an ecosystem supporting the 
instantaneous creation and dynamic evolution of secure 
collaborations across enterprise boundaries and in 
compliance with electronic contracts whose enactment is 
autonomic.
 Many of the ideas described in this paper are being 
tested in a simulated environment whose simulation 
model is built using OPNET Modeler5. In particular, basic 
security mechanisms, comprising: 1) distribution and 
enforcement of security policies, and 2) monitoring and 
profiling of user behaviour through anomaly detection, are 
currently being implemented. By further extending our 
simulation model we also plan to test some of the 
enhanced BCA functionality discussed in this paper. 
Longer-term plans include the development of an 
operational implementation as in the context of a larger 
Enterprise Grids infrastructure. 
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